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ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
WISCONSIN
HARNEY B. STOVER* and MARY PAT KOtjSTERER**
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of discovery techniques in preparation for litigation
has expanded greatly in Wisconsin in the last decade. This
growth should be expected to continue at an even greater rate
since the adoption by the Wisconsin Supreme Court of the new
Wisconsin Rules of Civil Procedure (effective January 1, 1976)
which provide for very liberal discovery procedures.
Two concepts of law which are frequently used to limit the
scope of the discovery process are the attorney-client privilege
and the attorney work product rule. Both of these concepts
have become firmly established in the law of Wisconsin. How-
ever, many attorneys and even judges frequently confuse the
two. While a particular item sought to be discovered may be
protected by both the attorney-client privilege and the work
product rule, the concepts are quite distinct. One is based in
the common law and the other is not; one "belongs" to the
client while the other "belongs" to the attorney; and each, for
the most part, protects different items from discovery for dif-
ferent reasons.
II. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The attorney-client privilege has long been an established
part of the common law of both England and the United
States.' It is given recognition in the attorney's oath, in the
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Code of Professional Responsibility 3 and in the laws of the
states. In Wisconsin, the attorney-client privilege was codified
as early as 1878 by the adoption of a statute which appeared
in the Revised Statutes of the State of Wisconsin as follows:
An attorney or counselor at law shall not be allowed to
disclose a communication made by his client to him, or his
advice given thereon in the course of his professional employ-
ment.'
That statute was based upon a similar section of the New York
Code which had been adopted one year earlier.5 The Wisconsin
reviser's note in 1878 indicated that the statute was declared
and adopted as a settled rule of public policy in order to pre-
vent it from being overruled by the statutory pronouncement
that a party may be a witness except in certain specified cases.,
Section 19, Chapter 523, Laws of 1927 added the following
sentence to the statute:
This prohibition may be waived by the client and does not
include communications which the attorney needs to divulge
for his own protection or the protection of those with whom
he deals, or which were made to him for the express purpose
of being communicated to another, or being made public.'
The reviser's note in 1927 stated that the statute did not ex-
press important and well established exceptions to the
attorney-client privilege as set forth in court decisions.' This
statute, as originally adopted in 1878 and revised in 1927, re-
mained unchanged and in full force and effect until the adop-
tion of the Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, which became effec-
tive on January 1, 1974.1 This resulted in the repeal of the
foregoing section of the statutes, which had been renumbered
in 1971 as section 885.22.10
In State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court," the court summa-
rized the policy considerations which have given rise to the
attorney-client privilege as follows:
3. 43 Wis. 2d xiii (1969).
4. REV. WIS. STAT. § 4076 (1878).
5. WISCONSIN ANNOTATIONS § 885.22, Reviser's Note 1878 (1970).
6. Id.
7. Wis. STAT. § 325.22 (1927).
8. WISCONSIN ANNOTATIONS § 885.22, Reviser's Note 1927 (1970).
9. Wis. STAT. §§ 901-11 (1973).
10. Wis. STAT. § 885.22 (1971).
11. 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967).
[Vol. 59
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The policy choice of the rule is clear. The administration
of justice is thought best promoted by a rule which encour-
ages clients to reveal the facts fully to their attorneys. By
encouraging revelation of facts to the attorney, the privilege
is also calculated to serve the basic objective of the jurispru-
dential system. Without the rule, parties would not reveal all
of the facts because of a fear of detriment or embarrassment.
It is better to have otherwise concealed facts within the
knowledge of the person charged with the direction of the
lawsuit, even though he must not reveal the communication,
than to have those facts or opinions buried within the knowl-
edge of the client. This is because the lawyer, by application
of professional skill, can best make use of what he has learned
has really happened and prepare proper defenses to aspects
of the case detrimental to his client. Although the communi-
cation may not be revealed unless the client so wishes, the
result of the privilege is a more informed resolution of contro-
versy, at least in the aggregate number of cases.'2
However, because the rule may operate to prevent a full disclo-
sure of the facts, it has always been narrowly construed in
Wisconsin.'3 In the Dudek case, the court also set forth the
policy reasons behind the restrictions placed on the scope of the
attorney-client privilege.
In discussing the reasons for the narrowness of the scope
of the attorney-client privilege, the courts almost invariably
look to the liberal policy of discovery evidenced by the mod-
ern statutory pretrial procedures. Besides the fact that the
privilege has a long history of rather restricted compass, there
is another reason for this restriction other than the liberality
of modern discovery. The narrowness of scope is due to the
procedural effect of placing an article of information under
the umbrella of the privilege. Unless one of the few exceptions
can be utilized, the protection afforded by the privilege is
absolute. No showing of necessity, hardship, or injustice can
require an attorney to reveal the protected information if his
client does not waive the privilege, no matter how necessary
the information is to a resolution of the particular issue on its
merits. This drastic consequence should be narrowly con-
fined.'4
12. Id. at 578-79, 150 N.W.2d at 398.
13. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 979 (E.D.
Wis. 1969); State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387
(1967).
14. 34 Wis. 2d at 581, 150 N.W.2d at 399, 400.
19761
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Because of the conflicting policy considerations, the
attorney-client privilege and the exceptions to it must be care-
fully examined.
A. Nature of the Communication
The attorney-client privilege extends only to confidential
communications.' 5 The term "communications" has never
been explicitly defined by either the courts or the legislature,
although in Dudek, Justice Beilfuss indicated that the term
does not necessarily include "facts or evidence.""6 It is clear,
however, that written and oral communications from the client
to his attorney and the attorney's advice given on the basis of
these communications come within the scope of the privilege. 7
On the other hand, pre-existing documents, such as wills and
deeds, do not become privileged merely because the client has
placed them in the hands of his attorney. 8
A special problem arises when the client conveys informa-
tion to the attorney through acts instead of words. Although
Wisconsin has not specifically dealt with this situation, if the
act is essentially communicative and intended to be confiden-
tial, it should properly be recognized as a communication.'9 A
parallel situation exists in the definition of a "statement" for
the purposes of the hearsay rule. In Wisconsin Statutes section
908.01(1), a statement for hearsay purposes is defined to in-
clude non-verbal conduct which is intended to be assertive.,
Therefore, when a client reveals confidential information to his
attorney in the course of obtaining legal assistance by a gesture
or some other physical conduct, that revelation should be
deemed a communication within the attorney-client privilege.
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that the application of the
15. Wis. STAT. § 905.03(2) (1973): Derber v. Burke, 239 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Wis.
1965); State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967);
Hoffman v. Labutzke, 233 Wis. 365, 289 N.W. 652 (1940).
16. 34 Wis. 2d at 578, 150 N.W.2d at 398.
17. State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967);
Continental Cas. Co. v. Pagorzilski, 275 Wis. 350, 82 N.W.2d 183 (1957); In re Down-
ing's Will, 118 Wis. 581, 95 N.W. 876 (1903); Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. A. Spiegel
Co., 155 Wis. 201, 144 N.W. 272 (1913).
18. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 89 (2d ed. 1972); State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court,
34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967).
19. MCCORMICK, EVMENCE § 89 (2d ed. 1972).
20. Wis. STAT. § 908.01(1) (1973): STATEMENT. A "statement" is (a) an oral or
written assertion or (b) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an
assertion.
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privilege cannot be made without concrete reference to the
specific issues and the particular facts of the case in which the
privilege is sought to be invoked.2'
Another element essential to the application of the
attorney-client privilege is confidentiality. As early as 1902, in
the case of Herman v. Schlesinger,22 the court refused to extend
the privilege to every communication made to the attorney and
to all knowledge obtained by him, whether from the client,
from a third party, or from other sources, simply because it is
obtained by reason of his professional employment. Citing an
earlier decision in Koeber v. Somers,23 the court stated:
[Tlhe privilege of secrecy as between attorney and client,
recognized by the statute, extends only to those communica-
tions made by the latter to the former which are of a confiden-
tial character .... 24
Because the privilege is personal to the client, his intention
with respect to the confidentiality of a communication should
be controlling.25
In keeping with its policy of narrowly defining the scope of
the attorney-client privilege, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
defined numerous situations in which any confidentiality is
destroyed and the privilege waived. Some of these exceptions
to the privilege were codified in the earlier statute dealing with
the privilege, and others were added to the new rules of
evidence effective July 1, 1974. Confidentiality is most clearly
destroyed when the client's communications to his lawyer are
made in the presence of third parties, other than certain agents
of the client and of the attorney,2 or when the communications
are intended to be made public." A person cannot transform
the nature of particular information merely by communicating
it to his attorney,2 and once the confidentiality has been lost
it cannot be regained. Therefore, a strict interpretation of the
21. 34 Wis. 2d at 586-87, 150 N.W.2d at 402-03.
22. 114 Wis. 382, 90 N.W. 460 (1902).
23. 108 Wis. 497, 84 N.W. 991 (1901).
24. 114 Wis. at 393-94, 90 N.W. at 464.
25. Koeber v. Somers, 108 Wis. 497, 84 N.W. 991 (1901); Estate of Hoehl, 181 Wis.
190, 193 N.W. 514 (1923); State v. Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d 486, 171 N.W.2d 349 (1969).
26. Wis. STAT. § 905.03(2) (1973); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American Plumbing &
Supply Co., 19 F.R.D. 329 (E.D. Wis. 1954). [Hereinafter cited as Sears.]
27. Sears, 19 F.R.D. 329 (E.D. Wis. 1954).
28. State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W. 387 (1967).
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privilege, as required by case law, could result in a waiver of
the privilege if the communication were overheard by an eaves-
dropper. Past cases have, in fact, sustained this view.2 1 It
should be noted, however, that the new rules of evidence pro-
vide greater protection against eavesdropping. Furthermore,
the intention of the client at the time of disclosure is controlling
so that a communication which is originally intended to be
made public cannot later be claimed to be privileged."0 For
example, in State v. Dombrowski,31 the defendant, while under
arrest for drunk driving, told his attorney of the location of a
body so that the authorities could be notified. When the defen-
dant attempted to assert the privilege during his trial for homi-
cide, the court held that the privilege had been waived because
the information had been intended to be disclosed to others.
Another exception to the rule involves communications in
furtherance of a crime or a fraud, including, but not limited to,
situations in which the attorney and client are conspirators. 32
The attorney-client privilege will not be permitted to obstruct
justice or further crime, and a client waives his privilege and
consequent right to confidentiality when he informs his attor-
ney that he intends to commit a crime or perjure himself. 3 The
Code of Professional Responsibility goes one step further than
the statutory privilege by requiring an attorney to divulge such
communications to the proper authorities, if necessary to avert
or rectify the wrongdoing.34 Furthermore, an attorney cannot
conceal his own participation in crime under the cover of the
attorney-client privilege 5.3 This exception to the privilege, how-
ever, does not extend to cases in which a client seeks the legal
assistance of an attorney with respect to a crime already com-
mitted.36 In such a case, of course, the privilege applies, but the
distinction between "confidential communications" and
"evidence" becomes crucial. Neither the client nor his attorney
is privileged to withhold evidence.3 7
29. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 90, n. 79 (2d ed. 1972).
30. Sears, 19 F.R.D. 329 (E.D. Wis. 1954).
31. 44 Wis. 2d 486, 171 N.W.2d 349 (1969).
32. Wis. STAT. § 905.03(4)(a) (1973).
33. In re Sawyer's Petition, 229 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
966(1956); Christensen v. U.S., 90 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1937).
34. DR 7-102(B), 43 Wis. 2d lxii (1969).
35. Dudley v. Beck, 3 Wis. 246 (1854).
36. Wis. STAT. § 905.03(4)(a) (1973).
37. State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967);
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Although death of the client does not automatically result
in a waiver of the privilege,3 it is waived when the communica-
tions are relevant to an issue between parties claiming through
the same decedent .3 The purpose of this exception is to protect
and carry out the true intentions of the deceased. Although this
waiver of the privilege usually arises in cases of testate and
intestate succession, it also is relevant to inter vivos transac-
tions." A distinction must be made, however, when the parties
are attacking the deceased client's will as a breach of contract.
In that case, the parties are not making claims under or
through the deceased but as adversaries of the deceased and his
estate, and the privilege is not waived.4"
A similar exception to the rules arises where the attorney is
an attesting witness for the client.2 If an issue in raised con-
cerning the attested document, the attorney may testify in his
capacity as an attesting witness because the privilege was
waived to that extent by the very act of the client in having the
attorney act as an attesting witness.43
The Code of Professional Responsibility of the American
Bar Association and the State Bar of Wisconsin provides as
follows:
Except when permitted under DR 4-101(C), a lawyer shall
not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvan-
tage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage
of himself or of a third person, unless the client consents after
full disclosure."
The confidentiality of communications is deemed waived as
a matter of law when there is an alleged breach of duty by
Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-102(A)(3), 43 Wis. 2d lxi (1969).
38. Wis. STAT. § 905.03(3) (1973); In re Smith's Estate, 263 Wis. 441, 57 N.W.2d
727 (1953); In re Mangan's Will, 185 Wis. 328, 200 N.W. 386 (1924); In re Cramer's
Will, 183 Wis. 525, 198 N.W. 386 (1924).
39. Wis. STAT. § 905.03(4)(b) (1973); In re Boerner's Estate, 46 Wis. 2d 183, 174
N.W.2d 457 (1970); In re Breese's Estate, 7 Wis. 2d 422, 96 N.W.2d 712 (1959).
40. Wis. STAT. § 905.03(4)(b) (1973).
41. In re Smith's Estate, 263 Wis. 441, 57 N.W.2d 727 (1953).
42. Wis. STAT. § 905.03(4)(d) (1973).
43. Boyle v. Robinson, 129 Wis. 567, 109 N.W. 623 (1906); In re Pitt's Estate, 85
Wis. 162, 55 N.W. 149 (1893).
44. DR 4-101(B), 43 Wis. 2d xxxviii (1969).
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either the attorney or the client.45 In a malpractice action, the
defendant-attorney is entitled to protect himself even if his
defense requires the revelation of communications otherwise
privileged.46 It would be unfair to permit a client to claim the
privilege and subject his attorney to liability, particularly when
the client, himself, is bringing the action. The attorney, how-
ever, must be careful to disclose only those communications
which are necessary to his defense. An intentional, or even
careless, exposure of all transactions with his client may expose
the attorney to an additional lawsuit or professional sanctions
if such transactions are immaterial to the malpractice issue.47
Similarly, if the client breaches his duty to the attorney by
not paying his legal fees, the client is effectively estopped from
asserting the attorney-client privilege.48 Again, however, the
attorney is relieved of the privilege's restriction only to the
extent necessary to protect his own legitimate interests.
A final situation in which a client's communications to his
attorney lose their confidential nature is that in which the at-
torney represents joint clients and a lawsuit subsequently a-
rises between those clients.49 The attorney's duty, as an officer
of the court, is to promote justice. He is not permitted to "take
sides" or remain silent where disclosure is necessary to a fair
resolution of his clients' dispute. When an attorney agrees to
represent both parties in a default divorce action or in a real
estate closing, he obviously exposes himself to a potential con-
flict of interest, and he is required by the Code of Professional
Responsibility to make a full disclosure of this fact to his
clients before agreeing to act as legal counsel for all of the
parties involved. A similar situation may arise in the insur-
ance industry. While the insurer has a duty to defend its in-
sured, there may be a dispute between those parties which will
necessitate the appointment of outside counsel for the insured.
45. Derber v. Burke, 239 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Wis. 1965); State v. Simmons, 57 Wis.
2d 285, 203 N.W.2d 887 (1973); State v. Markey, 259 Wis. 527, 49 N.W.2d 437 (1951).
46. State v. Markey, 259 Wis. 527, 49 N.W.2d 437 (1951); Foryan v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 27 Wis. 2d 133, 133 N.W.2d 724 (1965).
47. DR 4-101(B), 43 Wis. 2d xxxviii (1969); Wis. STAT. § 905.03(4)(c) (1973).
48. Murphy v. Gates, 81 Wis. 370, 51 N.W. 573 (1892).
49. Wis. STAT. § 905.03(4)(e) (1973).
50. Boyle v. Kempkin, 243 Wis. 86, 9 N.W.2d 589 (1943); Johnson v. Andreassen,
227 Wis. 415, 278 N.W. 877 (1938).
51. DR 5-105, 43 Wis. 2d xlvii (1969); see the Ethical Considerations, EC 5-15, 16
and 17, 43 Wis. 2d xlii, xliii (1969).
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The attorney-client privilege may be denied as to communica-
tions among the insured, the insurer and the company's legal
counsel for the period of time during which the legal counsel
was representing both the parties. It is quite important, there-
fore, that the attorney foresee potential conflicts and act
promptly to avoid them.-
In summary, the attorney-client privilege applies to com-
munications which are confidential. The attorney is bound by
the canons of his profession to protect the confidences of his
client, and he should carefully advise his client so that the
privilege is not unwittingly waived.
B. The Attorney-Client Relationship
The application of the attorney-client privilege is specifi-
cally limited to communications made by the client to his at-
torney, or the advice given by the attorney to his client based
on such communications.53 Furthermore, these communica-
tions must have been made in the course of the attorney's
professional employment by the client. 4 This definition raises
questions with respect to who qualifies as a "client," who quali-
fies as an "attorney" and what constitutes "professional" em-
ployment. This section will analyze what constitutes profes-
sional employment, while the definitions of attorney and client
will be dealt with in a later section.
The term "professional employment" refers to the relation-
ship between the attorney acting in his capacity as a legal
adviser and the client who has approached the attorney for the
purpose of utilizing his professional skills. It is not necessary
that the client retain the attorney consulted or that he pay a
fee for the services rendered. In Bruley v. Garvin,55 a 1900 case,
the defendant had approached an attorney, related his case
and elicited a legal opinion. The attorney, when called as a
witness in the lawsuit, testified that he knew the defendant was
involved in a lawsuit and that he was seeking legal advice on
the matter. However, he was not retained by the defendant and
52. DR 5-105, 43 Wis 2d xivii (1969).
53. State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967).
54. State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967);
Continental Cas. Co. v. Pagorzelski, 275 Wis. 350, 82 N.W.2d 183 (1957); In re Down-
ing's Will, 118 Wis. 581, 95 N.W. 876 (1903); In re Sawyer's Petition, 229 F.2d 805 (7th
Cir. 1956), Brayton v. Chase, 3 Wis. 406 (1854); Dudley v. Beck, 3 Wis. 246 (1854).
55. 105 Wis. 625, 81 N.W. 1038 (1900).
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did not consider him a client. The court held that the defen-
dant's communications were privileged:
In order to entitle a client to the statutory privilege, it is not
absolutely essential that a fee should be paid, or that there
should be an actual retainer. The exclusion of the evidence
is founded upon public policy, in the furtherance of justice,
to the end that a man may have free and unrestrained com-
munication with his legal adviser. There can be no reasonable
doubt that Salter [the attorney] was, for the time being,
Garvin's legal adviser. Garvin unquestionably sought him
and stated his case to him in his professional capacity, in
order to get legal advice thereon.
Furthermore, it is not necessary that legal proceedings be
commenced or contemplated before an attorney-client rela-
tionship exists. The court, in Dudley v. Beck, 7 quoted
Greenough v. Gaskill,58 with approval
If the privilege were donfined to communications connected
with suits begun, or intended, or expected, or apprehended,
no one could safely adopt such precautions as might eventu-
ally render any proceeding successful, or all proceedings su-
perfluous.59
However, a social visit with an attorney does not constitute a
professional relationship and statements made in such a con-
text are not privileged."0
There are several ways in which an attorney, can serve his
client which do not involve his professional skills as such. For
example, in Lacey v. Estate of Hanrahan, the plaintiffs
brought an action against the decedent's estate for money paid
to the decedent during his lifetime. The attorney for the dece-
dent had written a letter to the plaintiffs regarding the matter,
and the court held that the attorney's testimony with regard
to the contents of the letter was not privileged.
We think it clearly appears from the testimony that Mr. Egan
acted merely as a scrivener, and not as an attorney, and that
56. Id. at 631, 81 N.W. at 1039-40.
57. 3 Wis..246 (1854);
58. 1 Mylne & Keene, 98.
59. 3 Wis. at 255.
60. In re Schmidt's Estate, 266 Wis. 182, 62 N.W.2d 908 (1954); In re Callahan's
Estate, 251 Wis. 247, 29 N.W.2d 352 (1947).
61. 165 Wis. 352, 162 N.W. 179 (1917).
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he was correctly permitted to testify as to the contents of the
letter, and that his testimony should be strictly confined to
that, and not to statements made to him by the deceased
62
In other situations, an attorney may be acting only as an
agent of his client. Lawyers employed in the patent department
of a corporation or as house counsel for an insurance company
frequently act in this capacity. Several jurisdictions have held
that communications made to these attorneys, as agents, are
not within the ambit of the attorney-client privilege 3 and, in
view of Wisconsin's definition of the attorney-client relation-
ship, the same result would probably be reached in this juris-
diction. 4
The capacity in which the client acts in his transactions
with his attorney may also determine whether the necessary
professional relationship exists. In Estate of Hoehl,65 the ad-
ministrator of the estate was sued for fraud. The court held
that the communications made by the administrator to his
attorney regarding the estate were not privileged. The lawyer
was not the administrator's private attorney but represented
him only in his capacity as administrator. The attorney, there-
fore, had a duty to serve the estate and the court as well as the
administrator, and communications regarding the estate could
not be concealed. In another case66 the client sought legal coun-
sel from his attorney on one matter, and in the course of their
dealings he made certain admissions regarding another unre-
lated matter. The court held that these latter communications
were not protected by the privilege because they were not made
within the scope of the existing attorney-client relationship.
The attorney-client privilege continues to apply after the
relationship is terminated, but only as to those confidential
communications made while the relationship was in existence.
An attorney who had represented a husband and wife in adop-
tion proceedings and damage suits was later retained by the
husband in a divorce action. The wife attempted to disqualify
the attorney from testifying at the divorce proceedings, after he
62. Id. at 354-55, 162 N.W. at 180.
63. See Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 228 (1964).
64. Paper Converting Machine Co. v. FMC Corp., 215 F. Supp. 249 (E.D. Wis.
1963).
65. 181 Wis. 190, 193 N.W. 514 (1923).
66. The Plano Mfg. Co. v. Frawley, 68 Wis. 577, 32 N.W. 768 (1887).
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had withdrawn from the case, on the ground that he had pre-
viously been her attorney. The court found that the attorney
had represented both husband and wife only in matters where
there had been no conflict of interests. Since there was never
any attorney-client relationship between the attorney and the
wife in respect to divorce, the attorney's testimony was admis-
sible.67
C. Voluntary Waiver
Under the common law it was clear that only the client
could waive the attorney-client privilege."8 The Wisconsin stat-
ute which was in effect until the new Wisconsin Rules of Evi-
dence became effective on January 1, 1974, expressly indicated
that only the client could waive the privilege. 9 The new rules
of evidence adopted the same rule" except that the client class
was enlarged to include not only the client himself but also the
client's guardian or conservator, the personal representative of
a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar repre-
sentative of a corporation, association, or other organization,
whether or not in existence. Where an attorney's services in a
transaction are rendered to several clients, confidential com-
munications to him in regard thereto and his advice thereon to
the clients cannot be disclosed unless all of the clients waive
the privilege.71 However, there can be no waiver in the situation
where two or more clients have retained and consulted the
same attorney in a matter of common interest, because the
communications to the attorney are not privileged in a subse-
quent action between the clients.72 Where the client has died,
the privilege can still be waived, provided all of the parties who
claim under the client so stipulate." Again, however, there is
no privilege as to communications relevant to an issue between
parties who claim through the same deceased client, whether
the claims are by testate or intestate succession, or by inter
vivos transfer. 4 Hence, there can be no waiver issue in such
67. Grosberg v. Grosberg, 269 Wis. 165, 68 N.W.2d 725 (1955).
68. Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464 (1888); In re Sawyer's Petition, 229 F.2d 805
(7th Cir. 1956).
69. Wis. STAT. § 885.22 (1971).
70. Wis. STAT. § 905.03(3) (1973).
71. Herman v. Schlessinger, 114 Wis. 382, 90 N.W. 460 (1902).
72. Wis. STAT. § 905.03(4)(e) (1973).
73. In re Brzowsky's Estate, 267 Wis. 510, 67 N.W.2d 384 (1954).
74. Wis. STAT. § 905.03(4)(b) (1973).
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instances. The successor of an assignee for the benefit of credi-
tors or a trustee cannot waive the attorney-client privilege as
to his predecessor's communications to his attorney. 7 A trustee
in bankruptcy probably can waive the attorney-client privilege
because he stands in the place and stead of the bankrupt or,
in the case of a bankrupt corporation, in the place and stead
of its directors.7 6
D. The Corporate Client
Problems can arise in determining who is a client, when will
a person qualify as a client, who is an attorney and when is an
attorney acting as such. In the case of an individual, there is
no great difficulty in identifying both the attorney and the
client. However, when the client is a corporation, there are a
number of problems involved in determining the communica-
tions and persons protected by the attorney-client privilege.
The leading case on this subject is Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
American Gas Association.7 That case considered in depth the
issue of whether or not a corporation may claim an attorney-
client privilege and stated:
It is our considered judgment that based on history, princi-
ple, precedent and public policy the attorney-client privilege
in its broad sense is available to corporations, and we so hold.
. .. The attorney's work-product rule announced in
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451
(1947), remains unimpaired and it is something separate and
apart from attorney-client privilege.
Where a corporation is a client it must act through its officers
and agents. The character of the corporate organization will
vary from the small, family type, one-man variety to the
giant with its thousands of employees. The problems con-
cerning confidentiality will necessarily vary accordingly.
There is no reason to believe that the required confidentiality
cannot properly be maintained within the corporate family.
It can just as readily be dissipated. These matters will all
have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis. No one is wise
enough to decide them in advance.
75. Herman v. Schlessinger, 114 Wis. 382, 90 N.W. 460 (1902).
76. Weck v. District Court of Second Judicial District, 161 Colo. 384, 422 P.2d 46,
31 A.L.R.3d 552 (1967).
77. 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
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Certainly, the privilege would never be available to allow a
corporation to funnel its papers and documents into the
hands of its lawyers for custodial purposes and thereby avoid
disclosure. Likewise, it seems well settled that the requisite
professional relationship is not established when the client
seeks business or personal advice, as opposed to legal assis-
tance.
A corporation is entitled to the same treatment as any other
"client"-no more and no less. If it seeks legal advice from
an attorney and in that relationship confidentially communi-
cates information relating to the advice sought, it may pro-
tect itself from disclosure, absent its waiver thereof. 8
A number of cases from other circuits have similarly held
that a corporation is a client for the purpose of invoking the
attorney-client privilege. 79 Also, the Wisconsin Rules of Evi-
dence clearly make reference to "a corporation" as a client in
the section on who may waive the privilege."0
The question then arises as to which communications of
what employees of a corporation are subject to the attorney-
client privilege. It is clear that the client must be seeking and
receiving legal advice and not business advice on behalf of the
corporation or the persons connected with it." In this regard,
the advice sought and given need not be solely legal but must
be predominantly legal advice and not solely, or even substan-
tially, business advice.82
Two tests have developed for determining which corporate
employees' communications to an attorney for the corporation
will be subject to the attorney-client privilege. The first is the
78. Id. at 323-24.
79. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
974 (1971); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D.C. Del.
1954); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963); 8 in 1 Pet
Products, Inc. v. Swift & Co. 218 F. Supp. 253 (S.D. N.Y. 1963); Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962); Honeywell, Inc. v.
Piper Aircraft Corp. 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Federal Savings and Loan Insur-
ance Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537 (D.C. Nev. 1972); Burlington Industries v.
Exxon Corporation, 65 F.R.D. 26 (D.C. Md. 1974).
80. Wis. STAT. § 905.03(3) (1973).
81. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
82. U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D.C. Mass. 1950);
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792 (D.C. Del. 1954); U.S.
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 193 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. N.Y. 1960).
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"control group" theory or test which requires that the commu-
nicant be in a position to control or take a substantial part in
the decision about any action to be taken upon the attorney's
advice, or at least that the communicant be a member of a
group having such authority.83 This theory was really developed
in 1962 and has been followed by a number of courts since that
time. 4 (The test is whether or not the person communicating
with the attorney on behalf of the corporation is in a position
to control or take some substantial part in formulating corpo-
rate action upon the attorney's advice.) A corporate employee
who is merely a witness to the communication is not a member
of the "control group. '8 5 Similarly, an investigator appointed
by the corporation to investigate patent right conflicts,86 an
unidentified employee, or one identified by position only,87 and
a project engineer8 have been held not to be members of the
so-called "control group." It has been determined that since
they would not take a substantial part in decision-making
based upon legal advice rendered to them for the corporation,
communications to them and their communications to an at-
torney would not be privileged. Although membership in the
"control group" is generally determined by the degree of partic-
ipation in the decision-making process rather than rank, it has
been stated that the rank of a corporation's employees, serv-
ants and agents can be a factor in determining membership in
the "control group. 819
The second and more recent test for determining when a
corporate employee's communications to or from an attorney
are protected by the attorney-client privilege is the "subject
matter" test. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected
the "control group" test in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
Decker." In that case the court held that a communication
from a corporate employee to the corporation's attorney was
83. Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
84. Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Congo-
leum Industries Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Garrison v. General
Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th
Cir. 1968).
85. Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
86. Congoleum Industries, Inc. v. GAF Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
87. Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
88. Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963).
89. Rucker v. Wabash R. Co., 418 F.2d 146 (7th Cir. 1969).
90. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
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privileged even though the employee was not actually a mem-
ber of its control group. The court found that he was suffi-
ciently close to and identified with the corporation to render his
communication to the corporation's attorney privileged, in
view of the fact that the communication in question was made
at the direction of his superiors and the "subject matter" upon
which the attorney's advice was sought concerned the em-
ployee's performance of his employment responsibilities. This
would appear to be a logical approach to the problem of identi-
fying and protecting the confidentiality of communications
between a corporation and the corporation's attorney regard-
less of the rank or position of the person making or receiving
the communication on behalf of the corporation.
With regard to who is the "attorney" to whom or from
whom communications are privileged, it is clear that indepen-
dent counsel for the corporation would qualify and that the
privilege would extend to counsel's associates and employees.91
Corporate general counsel and their clerks have been held to
constitute attorneys within the attorney-client privilege,92 and
in-house counsel qualify under the same circumstances as out-
side counsel.93 Of course, in all instances, whether involving
outside counsel or the corporation's so-called in-house counsel
or permanently employed general counsel, the communication
must otherwise qualify for the protection afforded by the
attorney-client privilege.9"
On the the most interesting and important questions in this
area concerns the role of an independent attorney who is serv-
ing on a corporation's board of directors or who is acting as a
trustee in some capacity for a corporation. Apparently there are
no decisions on this subject, although for many years it has
been quite common in the United States for attorneys to serve
as directors of corporate entities. Attorneys are frequently
asked to serve as directors of corporations for the purpose of
rendering legal advice in the event that the board is faced with
a problem which requires immediate legal interpretation.
91. Dura Corp. v. Milwaukee Hydraulic Products, Inc., 37 F.R.D. 470 (E.D. Wis.
1965).
92. U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D.C. Mass. 1950).
93. Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corporation, 65 F.R.D. 26 (D.C. Md. 1974); 8
in 1 Pet Products, Ind. v. Swift & Co., 218 F. Supp. 253 (S.D. N.Y. 1963).
94. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. v. Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537 (D.C.
Nev. 1972).
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Problems may arise when an attorney is serving in a dual ca-
pacity as a member of the board of directors and as counsel for
the corporation. When a question of privilege arises in this
context, it is important that a distinction be made between
communications made by the attorney in-his capacity as a
director and those made in his capacity as legal counsel. Only
those communications made to the attorney in his capacity as
legal counsel and the legal advice rendered by him are subject
to the attorney-client privilege. It must always be remembered
that the attorney-client privilege, having a tendency to prevent
full and open disclosure of the truth, is to be construed as
narrowly as possible." This means that where there is any ques-
tion as to whether the attorney serving on the corporate board
of directors is acting in his capacity as an attorney or in his
capacity as a director of the corporation, the question will be
resolved in favor of full disclosure.
From a very practical point of view, it would probably be
in the best interests of the corporate client if the corporation's
general counsel, whether outside counsel or house counsel, did
not serve in a dual capacity as both general counsel and direc-
tor of the corporation. This would enable the corporation to
minimize the risk of foregoing the right to invoke the attorney-
client privilege in questionable instances of communications
between the board of directors and the general counsel. As
pointed out previously, corporations frequently seek attorneys
to serve on their boards of directors in order to obtain immedi-
ate legal advice at board meetings and business advice tem-
pered by sound legal background, knowledge and reasoning.
However, it is also true that all too often corporations, particu-
larly small ones, seek attorney board members in order to avoid
payment of some legal fees, and that some attorneys seek and
accept corporate directorships in order to "hold the client."
Neither of the latter reasons justifies the risk that the corpora-
tion might thereby be giving up or substantially narrowing its
right to invoke the attorney-client privilege in the event of civil
or criminal litigation. In more cases than not, a corporation's
interests would be better served by not having its general coun-
sel serve on its board of directors but instead attend all board
95. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Association, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929; Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddings & Lewis, Inc.,
296 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
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meetings strictly for the purpose of being available for and
rendering legal advice and consultation.
E. The Work Product Protection
In the course of discovery proceedings, confusion frequently
arises over which matters are covered by the attorney-client
privilege and therefore enjoy a status of absolute privilege, and
which matters are covered by the attorney's work product rule
and therefore are conditionally protected from discovery. The
work product rule and the attorney-client privilege are two
distinct legal concepts, and the former will not be covered in
depth in this article. However, the following distinctions
should be kept in mind.
While the attorney-client privilege applies to communica-
tions and advice thereon between the attorney and client, the
work product rule applies to the information the lawyer has
assembled and the mental impressions, legal theories and
strategies that he has pursued or adopted as derived from inter-
views, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, legal
and factual research, personal beliefs, and other tangible or
intangible sources." It must always be remembered that the
attorney-client privilege belongs to the client; only the client,
or someone acting on his behalf, can claim the privilege and
only the client can waive it.97 The work product rule, on the
other hand, protects the attorney's work, and only the attorney
himself can claim the protection.
As to the rules and guidelines for invoking the attorney's
work product rule, reference should be made to the leading
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Hickman v.
Taylor,99 and the leading decision of the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in State ex rel. Dudek v. Circuit Court."'°
F. New Federal and State Rules of Evidence
The new Rules of Evidence for Wisconsin Courts and Court
Commissioners, which became effective January 1, 1974, °11 are
96. 34 Wis. 2d at 589, 150 N.W.2d at 404.
97. In re Sawyer's Petition, 229 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1956); State ex rel. Dudek v.
Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967); Herman v. Schlesinger, 114 Wis.
382, 90 N.W. 460 (1902).
98. 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967).
99. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
100. 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967).
101. Sup. Ct. Order, 59 Wis. 2d Rl11l-13 (1974).
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substantially the same as what were then the Proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence.1 12 These new rules are, for the most part, a
more extensive codification of Wisconsin case law. However,
they do to some extent alter or extend the existing law as to
attorney-client privilege. The new statute, renumbered section
905.03 of the Wisconsin Statutes, reads as follows:
905.03 Lawyer-client privilege
(1) Definitions. As used in this section:
(a) A "client" is a person, public officer, or corporation,
association, or other organization or entity, either public or
private, who is rendered professional legal services by a law-
yer, or who consults a lawyer with a view of obtaining profes-
sional legal services from him.
(b) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably be-
lieved by the client to be authorized, to practice law in any
state or nation.
(c) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to
assist the lawyer in the rendition of professional legal serv-
ices.
(d) - A communication is "confidential" if not intended
be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclo-
sure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal
services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the
transmission of the communication.
(2) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to
refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from dis-
closing confidential communications made for the purpose of
facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the
client,
(a) between himself or his representative, or
(b) between his lawyer and the lawyer's representative,
or
(c) by him or his lawyer to a lawyer representing another
in a matter of common interest, or
(d) between representatives of the client, or
(e) between lawyers representing the client.
(3) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be
claimed by the client, his guardian or conservator, the per-
sonal representative of a deceased client, or the successor,
trustee, or similar representative of a deceased client, or the
successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation,
association, or other orqanization, whether or not in exist-
102. Decker, A New Wisconsin Evidence Code?, 56 MARQ. L. REv. xvii (1973).
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ence. The person who was the lawyer at the time of the com-
munication may claim the privilege but only on behalf of the
client. His authority to do so is presumed in the absence of
evidence to the contrary.
(4) Exceptions. There is no privilege under this rule:
(a) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud. If the services of the
lawyer were sought, or obtained to enable or aid anyone to
commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably
should have known to be a crime or fraud; or
(b) Claimants through same deceased client. As to a
communication relevant to an issue between parties who
claim through the same deceased client, regardless of
whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or
by inter vivos transaction; or
(c) Breach of duty by lawyer or client. As to a communi-
cation relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to
his client or by the client to his lawyer; or
(d) Document attested by lawyer. As to a communica-
tion relevant to an issue concerning an attested document to
which the lawyer is an attesting witness; or
(e) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to a
matter of common interest between 2 or more clients if the
communication was made by any of them to a lawyer re-
tained or consulted in common, when offered in an action
between any of the clients.
Unfortunately, the new rule on attorney-client privilege is
similar to the old rule in that it fails to define "communica-
tion." However, the new rule does define "attorney" and the
general rule of privilege in such a manner as to change the prior
law. In Brayton v. Chase,' 3 the court held that only those com-
munications made to an attorney who was licensed to practice
in Wisconsin courts could be accorded the privilege. State-
ments made to an assistant of the attorney were not pro-
tected. °4 The new rule rejects this position. Section
905.03(1)(b) defines "attorney" as anyone authorized to prac-
tice law in any state or nation and anyone who the client rea-
sonably believes is so authorized. Therefore, the law in Brayton
is now overruled. According to the committee notes of the judi-
cial council, the burden will be on the client to show the reason-
ableness of his belief that the one to whom he made confiden-
103. 3 Wis. 406 (1854).
104. Id. at 407-09.
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tial communications was an authorized attorney.10 5 Appar-
ently, the test will be an objective rather than a subjective one.
Under the new definition of the general rule of privilege, the
protection against "eavesdropping" has also been extended.' 6
Previously, in order for a communication to maintain its nature
of confidentiality, it could only pass between the client and his
attorney. Now, under section 905.03(2), the privilege extends
to confidential communications between the client and the at-
torney, their representatives, and attorneys representing the
same client or clients joined by a common interest. The only
qualification placed on this extended rule is that the communi-
cations must be made for the purpose of facilitating the rendi-
tion of professional legal services to the client.10
7
As pointed out earlier, the Wisconsin rule with respect to
attorney-client privilege was based on the then proposed fed-
eral rule. However, Public Law 93-595, Section 1, January 2,
1975, which created the new Rules of Evidence for United
States Courts and Magistrates ' 8 did not adopt the proposed
rule on attorney-client privilege. Instead, Article V, Rule 501,
states:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the
United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory author-
ity, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in the light of reason and experi-
ence. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect
to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, per-
son, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall
be determined in accordance with State law.
This statement of the general rule creates some confusion. In
federal courts, Wisconsin's new rule on attorney-client privi-
lege will apply only to civil actions, while the common law will
apply in criminal actions. The practical effect of this anomoly
may be insignificant since Wisconsin's rule is basically a devel-
105. 56 MARQ. L. REV. 243 (1973).
106. Id. at 245-46.
107. Wis. STAT. § 905.03(2) (1973).
108. 28 U.S.C. (1975).
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opment and codification of the common law. However, with
respect to the definition of an attorney and the extension of the
protection against eavesdropping, the federal district courts in
Wisconsin may be applying a different and more narrow rule
than would be used in the Wisconsin state courts where a crim-
inal action is being tried.
III. CONCLUSION
The privilege afforded confidential communications be-
tween attorney and client has been recognized in Wisconsin for
approximately a century. The law in this area has not changed
substantially over the years and the new Wisconsin Rules of
Evidence, for the main part, codify existing case law. However,
we can expect more cases involving the corporate client who
wishes to claim the privilege and new developments in this
area. In any case, it is the duty of attorneys to be aware of the
law and how to properly use it in the best interests of their
clients and the administration of justice.
Attorney-Client Privilege Guidelines
A. Communications from client to attorney and the attor-
ney's advice thereon leading to or in the course of the
attorney's professional employment cannot be disclosed
without the client's waiver of the privilege. The privilege
must be asserted by the attorney in the absence of the
client's waiver.
B. Communications subject to the privilege:
1. Must be confidential.
2. Must come from the client.
And in the case of a corporation,
a. From an employee having some element of con-
trol and participation as to any decision on the
attorney's advice, or
b. From an employee, at the direction of his superior
where the subject matter is the performance by
the employee of his duties of employment. (7th
Circuit)
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3. Must be made to the attorney in his capacity as
attorney for the client.
a. Includes the attorney's associates, employees,
and representatives.
b. Includes persons authorized, or reasonably
believed by the client to be authorized, to
practice law in any state or nation.
4. Must be related to the subject for which the attor-
ney is to be or has been employed.
C. Waiver
1. Can only be made by the client.
a. If the client dies, can be made by all who claim
under him.
b. Cannot be made by an assignee.
2. Must be made by all clients, if there is more than
one involved.
D. Exceptions
1. Communications concerning a crime or fraud to be
committed.
2. Communications concerning a crime or fraud being
committed by attorney and client.
3. Communications which the attorney needs to dis-
close to protect his own rights (only to the extent
necessary for his own protection) or the rights of
those with whom he deals.
a. In the case of attorney/client litigation.
b. In order to protect against charge of fraud or
crime.
4. Communications made to the attorney to be com-
municated to another or to be made public.
5. Communications made in the presence of third par-
ties, strangers, etc.
6. Communications concerning an attested document
to which the attorney is an attesting witness.
7. Communications relevant to a matter of common
interest in litigation between joint clients.
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